Agreed.
Right now you are identified (via ID or verifying name-address-roll, or sig-matching for mail-in, etc) then the ballot itself has no name.
And yeah, then some machine helps tabulate. But the paper is your source for audit. I don't know how the paperless DRE systems audit actual results (thankfully there aren't many and they are mostly in NOT in swing districts).
So yeah, the "front end" is probably the most different, in addition to the lack of paper.
All sign-ins seem hackable. Crypto wallets get hacked. Like i said, people are even hacking biometric auth. People will lose private keys...
If you tie ID verification to the vote then you lose anonymity of votes.
Some type of unique digital voter ID does sound good for all the tracking purposes you mention, but once you stick the internet (post-auth) between anything and the "ledger" you are adding denial-of-service potential, Man-in-middle potential, other buggy/reliability potential at a bunch of spots (client OS, client browser, wifi, isp).
Not really, i think there are probs during auth, during transmission of the vote AND after.
The problem-after-the-vote stuff is all related to a lack of paper-trail "manual insurance" IMO. Is it possible to audit a blockchain ledger?
Is there something like a 5-step verification?
Use your private key, then your eye or fingerprint, then receive a text (and hope your SIM hasn't been hacked), then use your password, then pingID or other MFA. But then how are we sure
@blazers isn't
fraudulently giving that person $10 to write-in Soros?
In-person, paper-based, anonymous still seems necessary, even if you couple it with more digital based parts of tracking (for eligibility, etc).